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Preface 
By Steven Dudley 
 
rganized crime is not an abstract concept for me. I grew up in Oak Park, a leafy 
suburb of Chicago with a population of about 60,000. In general, it was a very 
low crime city, which is perhaps why many mobsters made their homes there, 
among them Sam “Mooney” Giancana (pictured on the next page). 
Giancana’s connections to the mob dated back decades. He was a top leader during the 
1960s of what was called the “Chicago Family” of La Cosa Nostra. His run-ins with the 
law, and the sloppy management of his operations, put him at odds with some of his 
cohorts, and in 1975, three years after my family and I moved to the neighborhood, he 
was killed in his Oak Park home. 
The subject was one of national concern at the time. On March 4, 1983, a US Senate 
subcommittee convened a meeting in Chicago to tackle the difficult subject of organized 
crime in the city. It opened with a startling declaration: 
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“The scope of activities involving the syndicate or mob or outfit in the Chicago area is 
truly pervasive,” said subcommittee member and Senator William Roth, a Republican 
from Delaware, told the committee. “Organized crime in Chicago touches practically 
everyone’s life or livelihood. And the evidence shows that the tentacles of mob activity in 
this city reach into government, law enforcement, unions, and 
other legitimate political, social, and economic functions.”1 
Witnesses called by the subcommittee went on to describe 
organized crime’s deep roots in Chicago, its varied legitimate 
and illegitimate business interests, its enforcement tactics, its 
influence in society, and its political connections. 
 “The umbrella which protects the Chicago mob and the lynch 
pin which holds it together, enabling it to function, is its 
alliance with politics,” William F. Roemer, a former Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent and a consultant to the Chicago Crime Commission, 
wrote in a prepared statement. “Nowhere can organized crime operate effectively 
without the connivance of public officials. This would include law enforcement officers, 
legislators, judges and key public officials. We believe that nowhere in the country has 
this been truer than in Chicago.”2 
Chicago’s top crime boss, Anthony Accardo, alias “Big Tuna,” lived in River Forest, the 
town next to Oak Park. Accardo had been in organized crime since the 1920s, when he 
became an assassin for Al Capone.3 His nickname then was “Joe Batters,” a nod to his 
penchant for using baseball bats to dispense discipline and terror.4 One witness in the 
subcommittee meeting in 1983 described Accardo (pictured below) as the “consigliere” 
to the Chicago Family.5 “He was the best leader the Chicago mob has ever had,” Roemer 
wrote in his statement. 
Everyone in the area understood that Accardo was in the 
mob. His grandchildren played football with my older 
brothers, and he would occasionally attend the games with 
his bodyguards in tow. When we were teenagers, we would 
drive slowly by his undistinguished one-story house that 
was rumored to have several underground floors and 
tunnels to facilitate his escape should the authorities come 
to arrest him. They never did. 
Michael Spilotro, brother of Anthony Spilotro -- made 
famous by Joe Pesci’s portrayal of him in the movie 
“Casino” -- lived on the south side of Oak Park. Witnesses 
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in the subcommittee hearing said Anthony Spilatro, with the help of Michael, led the 
Chicago Family’s “invasion” of Las Vegas and points beyond.6 
A friend of mine stole beer from Michael Spilotro’s basement once. When Spilotro found 
out, he called my friend’s house and threatened his mother. My friend had to take a 
detour on his way to school to avoid that house until the news that the Spilotro brothers 
had been found, strangled and beaten to death, then buried in an Indiana 
cornfield.7 The brothers were last seen driving away from Michael Spilotro’s Oak Park 
home.8 
I tell these stories because there is often a 
distant feel about the way that journalists and 
researchers study these issues in other 
countries. We tend forget how integrated 
organized crime is in all of our lives. Whether 
you grew up in Chicago in the 1980s or you are 
living in modern-day Honduras, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua or Colombia -- the four 
countries in this study -- organized crime is a 
part of our societies, woven into the places 
where we make our homes, where we work, play sports and spend time with friends and 
family. 
 “You may ask where traditional organized crime is, where can you see it?” then Chicago 
Police Superintendent Richard Brzeczek stated in his written testimony to the 
subcommittee. 
Look around. There are many people in this room right now…Concerned citizens 
and businessmen, law enforcement officials, legislators, and various representatives 
of the media. We all have mortgages, belong to pension plans, have friends and 
acquaintances who we communicate openly with and may feel indebted to. Where 
do we buy our goods? Who does our dry cleaning or collects the garbage from our 
business establishments? Do we buy cigarettes or candy every day from certain 
vending machines? Who owns the parking lot where you park your car. This is 
totally irrespective of what city you live in, and it is in these questions that we find 
out where traditional organized crime can be found. Every person in this room 
undoubtedly has some money in their pocket or purse. Rest assured that a 
percentage of that money will end up in the hands of the leadership of traditional 
organized crime.9 
We also tend to oversimplify what organized crime is, splitting the characters in the 
story into “bad guys” and “good guys.” But organized crime exists because it fills needs 
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in our economies and provides the backdrop to much of our social lives. And it benefits 
many people well beyond those who are directly involved. 
Obviously, organized crime is also perverse, violent and destructive. In that regard, the 
1983 subcommittee hearing noted a recent spate of murders in the Chicago 
metropolitan area that it connected to organized crime activity. Between 1919 and the 
1983 hearing, the Chicago Crime Commission documented 1,081 organized crime-
related murders.10 In terms of deaths, the situation does not compare to that of present-
day Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia. Honduras alone -- a country with a 
population similar to the Chicago metropolitan area -- suffers close to 6,000 murders 
per year, many of these organized crime-related. 
Still, the similarities between the issues presented at the Senate subcommittee hearing 
and those we encountered in our two-year investigation into elites and organized crime 
in Central America and Colombia are striking. The subcommittee hearing was about 
Chicago, but they could have just as easily been speaking about Guatemala, 
Colombia, Honduras or Nicaragua. “Street taxes,” kickback schemes, corruption in 
public works contracts, and campaign financing with illegal monies are all part of 
organized crime in both places. 
More importantly, the main reason organized crime prospers remains the same no 
matter the place or time period -- corruption. 
“The seedbed of organized crime has consistently been recognized to be sophisticated 
white-collar crime activity coupled with public corruption,” Edward Hegarty, the Special 
Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Chicago office, told the subcommittee. “Organized crime 
flourishes … because of its relationship to public corruption and sophisticated white 
collar crimes.”11 
These relationships reach to the top of the political and economic food chain. Witnesses 
noted the deep connections between Chicago aldermen, a few mayors and the Chicago 
Family. One cited a New York case in which a noted mobster, who was eventually 
convicted, called as character witnesses the governor of that state, two former mayors of 
New York City, and the head of the country’s most powerful labor syndicate.12 
This is why we at InSight Crime decided to tackle the issue of elites and organized crime. 
It seems to be the forgotten lynchpin in understanding organized crime activity, whether 
we are talking about Chicago of the 1980s or modern-day Central America and 
Colombia. Elites control how our societies, and our political and economic systems, are 
constructed. They decide where we channel our public resources, how we prosecute 
wrongdoing, and how we regulate commerce and trade. If they tolerate or engage in 
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corruption and crime to further their own ends, they are participating in the debilitation 
of the state and laying the seeds for organized crime to thrive. 
The result of this corruption and neglect was as evident in Chicago in the 1980s as it is 
in Latin America today. Like Chicago at that time, local law enforcement agents in the 
region have inadequate legal and forensic tools and severely resource-limited witness 
protection programs. In an effort to keep corruption at bay, personnel are constantly 
rotated, which severely hampers their ability to develop intelligence sources or carry out 
long, complicated investigations. Those charged with fighting organized crime do not 
have adequate training, and are in a vulnerable position because they often live in 
communities alongside underworld figures. 
What the subcommittee did note, however, was the necessity of exposing organized 
crime, and the networks it creates, to the public. The Chicago Crime Commission was 
the first to declare Al Capone public enemy number one, according to its President Gail 
Melick, which he said helped bring about the mobster’s eventual prosecution. “Such an 
open assessment of organized crime figures, and such publicity, was effective then, and 
could be now,” Melick testified.13 
We at InSight Crime -- and our partner investigative teams in Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua -- are of the same mind. We are not prosecutors or law enforcement 
agents. We are a multi-disciplinary team of investigators from different countries who 
seek to understand the dynamics between organized crime and the elites. Rather than 
identifying a “public enemy,” we are trying to expose how these elites interact with 
organized crime, both willingly and unwillingly, and the dangers that this interaction 
poses to economic development, democratic governance and human rights. 
The tone of the 1983 subcommittee meeting was one of urgency and desperation. It is 
not unlike the tone of public hearings today about the situation in Central America and 
Colombia. But things can change. Chicago is a good illustration. The government has 
arrested numerous Chicago Family bosses since then, and the mob is greatly debilitated, 
albeit still functioning. Corruption and gangland violence have also considerably 
declined. The changes began with public discussion of these matters, such as during the 
1983 subcommittee hearing at the US Federal Court House. 
Then, as now, we need to know what, and who, we are talking about before we can tackle 
elite links to organized crime, and that is the job we have started with this investigation. 
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Introduction 
By Steven Dudley 
 
rganized crime and the violence associated with it is the preeminent problem in 
Latin America and the Caribbean today. The region is currently home to six of 
the most violent countries in the world that are not at war. Four of those 
countries are in Central America, where we centered our research. Public opinion polls 
also consistently show that crime and insecurity are at the top of the region’s concerns. 
Governments and multilaterals have channeled vast resources towards dealing with this 
issue, and international aid and humanitarian organizations have shifted their mandates 
to better confront its effects. 
The problem is as broad as it is deep. It touches all aspects of society, politics and 
business in these countries. Organized crime is undermining democracy and distorting 
economies. It is fueling small gangs and international criminal syndicates that use their 
money and weapons to co-opt or subvert the security forces. It is penetrating the state, 
breaking apart the institutions that were established to protect citizens and promote 
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prosperity, and turning them into tools for wielding power. And it is changing the 
dynamics of international affairs, politics and elite relations in these countries. 
However, the analysis of organized crime has not kept pace with these developments. 
Indeed, the idea for this study came from scanning governmental and non-
governmental reports on organized crime and realizing that too often it is characterized 
as separate from, rather than integrated with, the communities in which it operates. In 
the traditional conception, criminal economies are considered to be parallel, not 
essential, to the lives of those who live where they operate. The protagonists are 
identified as gang members, thugs and hoodlums; rarely as bankers, politicians and 
security forces personnel. Governments rarely look inward at their own history, their 
geography, or their failing institutions to find out why organized crime is thriving in 
their country. They blame what they see as outsiders -- frequently foreigners -- or those 
on the margins, particular the poor. There are Italian, Russian, Colombian and 
increasingly Mexican mafias that are considered to be somehow distinct and ruthless 
because of their upbringing, their culture, or their ethnicity. 
The result is a distorted view of who the criminals are and how they gained such a solid 
foothold in the region. Traditional assessments have little concept of organized crime’s 
activities and businesses, the role it plays and how it is integrated into the economy, 
politics and social life of communities. These assessments have yet to measure how 
crime impacts governance and democracy, from local community associations to the 
national vote. And they struggle to conceptualize the role crime plays in the formation of 
the state, from both an economic perspective and a security perspective. 
What’s more, most assessments focus on two aspects of the government’s efforts against 
organized crime: its ability to reform or beef up its judicial system or security forces; and 
its ability to implement social and economic programs to keep potential recruits from 
joining organized criminal gangs. The emphasis of these assessments is greatly 
influenced by the principal ways in which they view crime, i.e., as the result of a “failed” 
state or a “failed” economy. 
This view leads to a false choice, one in which governments, multilaterals, foundations 
and others must decide between “good guys” and “bad guys” in a zero-sum game. This is 
a dangerous way to frame the issue, as it cuts off huge portions of society, politics and 
the business sector who, whether they like it or not, must operate within or around 
organized criminal activities. It also ignores the West’s own history, in which pirates, 
bootleggers and others played important roles in the construction of social, economic 
and political structures. 
In our study, we are seeking to expand the notion of how organized crime works. We see 
it as something that is integrated into society, into the development of a country’s 
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economy, its governance structures, and social groups. Organized crime does not 
penetrate as much as it blends in with the various parts of the community, the political 
class and the business moguls. This includes the “elite,” i.e., decision-makers, 
influencers, political operators, and those who control capital and the means of 
production. 
By expanding who we include in our study, we can see the whole picture, one that is not 
restricted to a zero-sum game of cops and robbers, but considers more nuanced and 
little-understood factors to identify why this phenomenon is so hard to eliminate, and 
what we can do to foster a society that does not reward criminal activity, especially 
activities that rely on violence. Specifically, we are interested in exploring three areas 
that deserve more attention: organized crime’s interaction with economic development, 
governance, and social and cultural dynamics. 
On the economic side, organized criminal groups are overrunning local economies by 
buying large tracts of land, purchasing huge quantities of local goods, commandeering 
public works projects, and developing economic conglomerates. In many cases, they are 
emerging as a new elite. In other cases, they are working closely with traditional 
economic powers. In both instances, economic development may begin as a secondary 
concern for the criminal group, but its activities can result in lucrative ventures that fit 
into a country’s larger economic project and contribute mightily to a country’s economic 
growth. This can also give the criminals an avenue to climb the social ladder and gain 
legitimacy. 
Still, the impact of organized crime on something as complex as economic development 
is hard to determine because it is not uniform. Organized crime may retard economic 
development if it strengthens traditional, less labor-intensive industries such as cattle 
farming, or if illicit monies are used to undercut competitors and distort the market. 
However, a community may also flourish if criminal groups invest heavily in labor-
intensive business such as road-building or other construction projects, move capital 
through the local financial system, or purchase large amounts of local agricultural 
goods. 
In essence, criminal groups have diversified their business portfolios and have 
sometimes become integral players in bringing about what some might call economic 
progress. They are critical actors in rural investment plans, agro-industrial projects, 
tourism, real estate, the mining industry and other capital-intensive economic projects 
throughout the region. Their interests regularly intersect with those of the government 
and private economic groups through a complicated web of partnerships and alliances. 
Their participation, and injection of resources, can ensure the long-term health of these 
projects, which many outside observers consider the bulwark of economic development 
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in the region. This leaves us with the critical question of whether organized crime’s 
participation in economic activity is uniformly negative, as it is often portrayed. 
There is less ambiguity with regard to organized crime’s impact on governance, which is 
overwhelmingly negative. Criminals have infiltrated political parties or co-opted them 
with large campaign or other contributions. In some cases, they have created their own 
political parties. In all cases, it appears that they are using increasingly decentralized 
political systems, or co-opting centralized systems, to establish virtual islands where 
criminals hold power. The exercise of power in these islands answers to the criminals’ 
interests, rather than to the public interest, thwarting political activity, undermining 
democracy, and subjugating minority, women and ethnic groups’ interests in the 
process. 
There are also indications that organized criminal groups are undermining the entire 
political system in countries across the region by developing strategies to control local 
and national elections. They are securing resources by placing allies in key political 
posts, ministries, and committees. And they are altering the checks and balances system 
by penetrating high courts and influencing the selection of candidates for many sectors 
of government and the security forces. 
Finally, organized crime is altering social and cultural relations in communities across 
the region. Partnering with or coercing community, religious, indigenous or intellectual 
leaders, these organized criminal gangs are usurping power across multiple milieu and 
influencing how leaders organize, how they interact with other state and private actors, 
and how they develop relations with their constituents. The links between these leaders 
and organized crime have broad implications for community dynamics, especially in 
cultural, educational and religious environments. 
In sum, we began this study with the belief that we could deepen our understanding of 
how organized crime had become part of the communities, the governing structures and 
the economic elites who make the decisions that shape these societies. We have spent 
two years developing case studies in four countries that illustrate the complex, 
intertwined nature of these relationships. But before we go into the details, we need to 
outline our methodology and set out the limitations of our study.  
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Methodology 
By Steven Dudley 
 
his study focuses on four countries: Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Colombia. Each presents different challenges and opportunities for research, and 
makes its own contribution to our snapshot of elite groups and organized crime 
in the region. 
The long history of organized crime in Colombia and the dismantling of some of the 
country’s largest criminal groups through a public peace process have created an 
incredible opportunity for judicial authorities and investigators to unearth the means 
and methods by which these groups co-opted so many and influenced so much. For this 
reason, Colombia provides the empirical base from which we draw general conclusions 
about modus operandi, and gives us a solid foundation to develop hypotheses about how 
criminal groups intersect with economic, political and intellectual elites on a regional 
level. 
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InSight Crime’s researchers in Colombia have been following this process for more than 
a decade. They have interviewed dozens of criminal actors and still have access to many 
of these actors in both Colombia and the United States. These include some of the top 
paramilitary leaders, who demobilized and remain incarcerated in both countries. The 
researchers also spoke to prosecutors and accessed judicial records and testimony that 
describe these connections and their development over a period of many years. These 
records, testimonies and interviews are the base upon which the researchers develop 
their hypotheses about how organized crime intersects with elites. 
The Central American nations selected for study represented a much greater challenge. 
Judicial records are scant. Criminal actors are not as visible or public, and not nearly as 
accessible. Judicial authorities are less forthcoming and criminal cases often buried 
behind many layers of bureaucracy. In part, this is why it is so important to study these 
countries. There is a gap in knowledge and a limited public record of how the criminal 
and elite worlds intersect. While this represents a tremendous methodological 
challenge, which is delineated below, it also provided researchers with added 
motivation, and the ability to break new ground. 
What’s more, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua represent an illuminating cross-
section of criminal organizations and types of elites. Elite dynamics in each of these 
countries are different, but with important commonalities. The makeup, role and 
penetration of criminal groups into intellectual, societal, legal, government and 
economic circles is varied, but interrelated. Our findings give us a greater understanding 
of the local and national dynamics that influence these intersections between organized 
crime and elites, and allow us to draw broader conclusions about what unifies these 
examples. 
We produced two case studies on each country. Broadly speaking, each case study 
illustrates a particular relationship between elites and organized crime. This 
relationship could be economic, political or social in nature. It could be direct or 
indirect. It could even be that organized crime was ultimately used as a pretext for an 
elite group to strengthen its control of the decision-making process, institutions, a 
political party or a business association. 
While we would have liked to select case studies that allow for seamless comparisons 
between countries, organized crime does not lend itself easily to that methodology. 
There are, in essence, very few cases of crime-elite links that are solid enough to publish 
and allow for meaningful discussion about the issue. There is little room for error in this 
regard. Publicly outing some of the most powerful sectors of these countries as having 
links to crime is a huge risk that we took with our partners, but one we thought 
necessary in order to push forward the debate about what should be done. 
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With our selection limited, we had to decide how we could develop a representative 
cross-section of studies that would allow us to draw conclusions applicable across 
borders. We initially sought to approach that challenge by dividing the project into 
social, economic and political elites. That too proved impractical, given the significant 
and complicated overlap between these different types of elites. The issue, of course, was 
uniformity. Each of these countries has different types of organized crime. Their 
governments have different levels of stability. Their elites have different bases of power. 
Their geography varies. In sum, there are simply too many variables and no perfect way 
to tackle this issue. So, in the end, we opted to keep the categorization of our case 
studies broad: one we deemed “national;” the other “local.” 
The “national” case studies have certain characteristics no matter the country in 
question. First, the cases are illustrative of a national-level phenomenon -- the criminal 
groups’ modus operandi, origins, their reach and penetration of the state, and their 
relationship with the elites are all elements that touch the country as a whole. Second, 
the cases involve at least one of the most important sectors of the elite. That elite group 
is a primary agent in the construction of society and the state, a major political or 
economic player, or some combination of these. Third, the cases reach the upper 
echelons of government and impact how the state deals with organized crime. This 
includes government efforts to jail suspects, prosecute them, and confiscate property. 
More importantly, the cases touch on how an elite manages questions of organized 
crime, and who ultimately makes those decisions. 
The “local” case study is more limited in geographic scope but is just as illustrative, since 
it shows how elite-criminal relationships develop and evolve in a more intimate setting. 
The local case studies involve local politicians, regional economic elites and powerful 
social actors. These actors’ interactions with organized crime are not uniform but are 
similar enough that they help us draw region-wide comparisons about how the 
dynamics at the local level form the foundation from which national cases emerge. 
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In all the studies, we have used the same foundation to make our case for the 
connections between elites and organized crime. At its apex, this is based on court 
documents from cases that have been resolved; prosecutorial investigations that have 
led to convictions; testimony that has helped lead to jail sentences. In the best-case 
scenarios, we have spoken to the protagonists of these criminal acts or obtained their 
testimonies; and we have interviewed the prosecutors and government investigators 
who built these cases and readied them for judicial scrutiny. We have worked hard to 
obtain other documentation as well, such as property records, public works contracts 
and other government documents, where relevant and available. 
When judicial and other documentation was not available -- either because records were 
sealed or because there has not been any formal accusation against the criminal actors 
in question -- we relied on sources close to the case to provide this foundation. These 
included prosecutors, police, military and intelligence officials; criminal protagonists 
and their lawyers; and eyewitnesses and others who could provide first-hand accounts. 
Some of this work was supplemented with government intelligence documents. 
However, we did not rely solely on intelligence documents for any part of our cases, and 
worked to get accounts from various sources to corroborate their information. 
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Finally, we pored over numerous press accounts, academic reports, non-governmental 
investigations and other third-party documentation. Many of these sources led us to 
primary sources or pointed us in new investigative directions. Others served as a means 
to double-check our information, or our investigative line of inquiry. We have added to 
our knowledge base by interviewing numerous experts, academics, political analysts, 
investigators and others. These interviews helped us establish sound hypotheses 
regarding the dynamics between elites and organized crime, as well as to frame the key 
concepts that bracket the study -- organized crime and elites being the two most 
important. 
In all, we have carried out more than 200 interviews in six countries. We have gathered 
paperwork from court files and other official documents in seven countries. We met on 
two occasions as a team to debate and determine lines of inquiry, form hypotheses, and 
to outline the reports. We have also held closed-door sessions with experts in each 
country to obtain feedback on our hypotheses and case study work. 
Our case studies and the resulting conclusions provide the most comprehensive attempt 
to chronicle and analyze the proverbial elephant in the room: the elites’ relationship 
with organized crime in parts of Central America and Colombia. 
Methodological Considerations on Data Collection 
In an ideal world, each team would have worked with similar data and an equal number 
of judicial records and testimonies across multiple countries. The reality is that 
investigating organized crime is varied as well as difficult. The variables are numerous, 
and as complex as the subject itself.  
To begin with, there is a wide variation in the quality and quantity of information 
available on this subject in each country. As noted above, Colombia’s long history of 
organized crime and its recent public peace process give researchers in that country a 
huge advantage over investigators in Central America, where criminal groups are an 
understudied, little-documented phenomenon. The resources available in Colombia, for 
instance, include not just judicial sources and statements from criminal actors, but a 
tradition of in-depth academic research, media coverage and public sector reports on 
this issue. To complicate matters, the levels of information differ in each of the Central 
American countries we have focused on. This means that the starting points are not 
equal, creating an uneven foundation for cross-border comparison. 
Secondly, there is a question of access. Even if the documentation, testimonials and 
judicial records were of equal quality, circumstances can make access to this 
information difficult or impossible. Embedded in this issue is the question of safety, 
both for our investigators and our sources. Throughout the two-year process, many 
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investigators felt inhibited by the subject matter. Some were forced to drop out of the 
project due to safety concerns. Others simply self-censored. We at InSight Crime 
followed strict safety protocols and implemented measures to keep materials safe from 
prying eyes. We have kept many sources anonymous in order to protect them from 
repercussions. But, inevitably, some things will go unreported. 
Thirdly, the reliability of the documents collected varies widely depending on the 
country, region, subject matter, and numerous other factors. The motivations that 
officials and others may have for manipulating information in criminal matters, for 
example, are too many to delineate here. The quality of judicial investigations varies 
widely, due not just to officials’ fear of or alliances with criminal groups, but also to their 
level of competence. Despite this, judicial inquiries are generally given very high value 
on our scale, regardless of the training, motivation or position of the prosecutor in 
question. This is a limitation for any investigation that relies so heavily on judicial 
records. 
To deal with these issues, we developed a means of documenting cases and analyzing the 
information obtained, breaking the information down by source. The result is a tier 
system that gave us an approximation of the reliability of the information we were 
working with, so as to better gauge its application to our case studies and our broader 
conclusions and analyses. It is not scientific. It is more of a guidepost, a broad set of 
standards by which to judge our work. 
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The information that comes from each source can be further broken down by type of 
information: eyewitness, protagonists’ accounts, hearsay, opinion, perception, analysis. 
Sometimes, a single source can provide each type of information. As noted above, for the 
purposes of this project, we attempted to construct our case studies using as many 
primary source and witness interviews as possible. We combined that information with 
judicial records and intelligence reports, corroborating this through secondary sources, 
media accounts and other documents. 
We focused on gathering as much factual information as possible, but the nature of this 
study required that the interviewees give their opinions, analysis and perceptions as 
well. The essence of the project -- that of defining who has enough influence to be 
counted as an “elite” -- is based on perceptions, and so it was necessary to ask our 
subjects to share their judgments with us. Having said that, we worked hard to 
distinguish opinion, hearsay, perception and analysis from direct accounts by 
eyewitnesses or protagonists. 
If we were to rank the information available on countries examined in our case studies, 
we would get a scale that puts Colombia at the top in terms of quality and quantity of 
information that was corroborated, verified and checked, and Honduras at the bottom, 
with Nicaragua and Guatemalasomewhere in between. This assessment of the 
authenticity, accuracy and trustworthiness of the information is an important part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elites and Organized Crime             	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
www.InSightCrime.org   20	  
our overall effort to be as transparent as possible about our methods, and their 
limitations. 
There are, in the end, a lot of limitations on the study of organized crime, which 
investigators have long acknowledged. Perhaps the best way to think of this type of 
research is to see it less like scientists working in a lab and more like -- as Donald 
Cressey has put it1 -- archeologists digging through the remains of long-lost society: we 
have too often arrived after the fact and are sifting through the pieces in order to 
reconstruct how that society operated. 
We have done a lot of “archeology” in our two years tackling the question of organized 
crime and elites. The result gives you the basics about this issue -- the paramount 
question in the region -- and a framework to apply that knowledge across borders. This 
document is not meant to be the definitive account. It is meant to start a discussion, 
open the debate and push the dialogue forward. 
Endnotes 
[1] Donald R. Cressey, “Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime as a Social Problem,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 374, November 1967, p. 110.  
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Conceptual Framework: Organized Crime 
By Steven Dudley 
 
his project defines organized crime as: a structured group of people that 
associate on a regular and prolonged basis to benefit from illicit activities and 
illegal markets. This group can be local, national or transnational in nature, 
and its existence is maintained using violence and threats; corruption of public 
officials; and its influence on society, politics and the economy. 
From a legal standpoint, we drew from the United Nations’ Palermo Convention, which 
defined an “organized criminal group” as “a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or 
more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with this Convention, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”1 
From an academic standpoint, we drew primarily from Joseph Albini and Jeffrey 
McIllwain, who wrote that organized crime is:   
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A form of criminal activity within a social system composed of a centralized or 
decentralized social network (or networks) of at least three actors engaged in an 
ongoing criminal enterprise in which the size, scope, leadership and structure of the 
network is generated by the ultimate goal of the enterprise itself (i.e., how the crime 
is organized). This goal takes advantage of opportunities generated by laws, 
regulations, and social customs and mores and can be pursued for financial profit 
and/or the attainment of some form of power to effect social change and/or social 
mobility via the leveraging and brokering of the network's social, political and 
economic capital. Members of the network can be from the underworld or the 
upperworld. In some forms, force and/or fraud, are used to exploit and/or extort 
victims, while in others illicit goods and services are provided by members of the 
network to customers in a marketplace where such activity is often permitted 
through the establishment of practices which foster the compliance and/or 
acquiescence of corrupt public and private sector officials who receive remuneration 
in the form of political favors or in the form of direct or indirect payoffs.2 
Our broad interpretation of organized crime gives us the ability to probe the subject 
from an academic and a policy perspective. It permits us to see organized crime as a 
pervasive presence in society, involving wealthy and poor, elite and marginalized, 
politicians and plebeians. In essence, like Albini and McIllwain, our concept of 
organized crime rests on the notion that it is a structured, multi-stakeholder enterprise 
that depends on a network or networks of all classes that are created over time in both 
the illegal and legal realms. 
Our definition of organized crime also includes the provision of both goods and services. 
Organized crime meets the needs of the society in which it functions.3 These goods and 
services can mesh with both state and private economic activity. In fact, in some 
instances organized crime serves as one of the few motors of economic activity, can 
provide a means to obtain otherwise unobtainable social and economic status, and, as 
we shall see, can also fulfill government functions when the state is unable. 
Scholars differ widely on what is the most important common denominator between 
criminal groups, as they vary so much from place to place. And we recognize that there 
are numerous types of criminal organizations: those that have strong familial or ethnic 
ties; those that are from a specific region or neighborhood; those that come from 
military or police backgrounds; those that share a religious or a political ideology; to 
name just a few. However, trying to determine one single origin, style or background is 
futile and can be counterproductive, as Albini has rightly pointed out.4 
Organized crime, as Albini states, is more properly understood in the larger context and, 
in the end, is part of its “social system”: “Serving as an intermediary source between the 
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legal normative and the social normative systems in society, the syndicated criminal 
dedicates his energy and skills towards erecting a structure that, although illegal, then 
becomes a functioning part of the social system with which it operates.”5 
Just how that structure is organized and operates almost entirely depends on its end 
goals. In line with D.R. Taft and R. W. England, as well as Albini,6 we see two major 
types of organizations. One is predatory or parasitic. It lives from extortion, theft and 
other means of rent extraction from the area in which it operates. This extraction is 
frequently couched in terms such as “protection,” which, as we shall see, is not always a 
euphemism. This type of organization is often established in a way that allows it to 
control physical territory, and it depends on the regular and open display and threat of 
force to exert its will. The second type of organization is service-oriented (or 
transactional) and seeks to fill a demand in the market. This type of organization has a 
structure that is designed to fill that need, whether it is illegal drugs, contraband, 
prostitution or other illicit goods or services. 
There are two ways these organizations can grow: obtain more market share in a specific 
business or businesses; obtain control of more territory to “tax” legal and illegal 
businesses. Both types of businesses create and use a vast network of patrons and clients 
to maintain and expand their influence. Of course some organizations are both parasitic 
and service-oriented. Those are the most complex of criminal groups but also some of 
the most volatile and unstable. As the terms “parasitic” and “service-oriented” suggest, 
their businesses are often at cross-purposes. 
The structures of either of the aforementioned categories can be hierarchical or 
horizontal. They can be large or small in numbers. Some have formal rules, initiation 
rites and other norms. But many organizations do not have such strict codes of behavior 
and defy the traditional view of the mafia as depicted in the movies or the media. This 
type of “disorganized” crime generates more amorphous networks whose members only 
intermittently interact with each other, and have a list of partners and allies that can be 
in near constant flux.7 
These organized crime groups must be willing and able to employ violence.8Organized 
crime’s regular use of violence -- both internally to discipline and externally to keep 
economic and often social control -- as well as its regular collection of “taxes,” is what 
puts it in its most direct competition with the state whose essential function is that of 
providing protection to its citizens in return for taxes. Organized crime’s use of violence 
can fundamentally undermine that social contract or establish a kind of parallel social 
contract. In the most extreme cases, criminal groups become the guardians of specific 
geographic areas, giving these groups immense political and social capital from which 
they construct a virtual fortress around themselves. 
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Still, we need not overstate the use of violence. Violence is a means, not an end, in 
organized crime. It can be seen as a weakness as well as a strength. “Violence is not a 
necessary concomitant of organized crime,” Michael D. Maltz wrote. “Rather, it can be 
viewed as a substitute for economic and political power for those who lack access to 
these subtler means of coercion.”9 
What’s more, the relationship between organized crime and the state is complicated and 
dynamic, and not one-sided. Peter Lupsha famously broke it down into three stages: 
predatory, where criminal actors seek expansion at the expense of all external actors, 
including the state; parasitic, when the criminal groups suck and use the resources of 
the state; and symbiotic, in which the criminal organizations work in concert with the 
state.10 Lupsha described this relationship as sequential, but it need not be. 
 
What’s more, we need to consider organized crime from the state’s perspective, i.e., as 
one that state actors or elites with close ties to the state seek. On the economic front, 
criminal groups can represent a source of revenue, economic growth, and economic and 
political opportunity. On the military front, they can represent a willing ally, one that is 
ready to commit resources to help secure territory or space from a violent or destructive 
actor in ways the state is not willing or able to. 
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In these cases, the criminals’ role is not seen as predatory but rather as symbiotic -- the 
state needs the criminals in order to achieve what it cannot achieve alone. Finally, 
organized crime can serve the state as an ideological construct, a useful political foil as 
the state -- or a particular elite -- seeks to expand its role and its power. In our case 
studies, we shall explore the circumstances in which organized criminal groups and the 
state interact in myriad ways, sometimes at odds with one another and sometimes in 
synchronicity. 
Organized Crime: Our Guiding Theses 
This study is broken down by country, but there are some basic theses about organized 
crime that run throughout the study and are important to delineate at the outset. These 
theses inform our understanding of how we believe criminal actors emerge and the role 
they may play in the development of the state, the economy and the society in which 
they operate. They are, in other words, the foundation from which we draw many of our 
preliminary conclusions about how and why organized crime and the elites interact and 
intersect in the economic, political and social realms. However, they are also fallible, 
and the case studies will allow us to test them.     
Thesis 1: Organize crime flourishes where states are absent, inept, or 
corrupt, or a combination of the three. 
Organized crime serves two basic but fundamental services: providing protection and/or 
the appearance of a legitimate authority where there is no recognized or legitimate 
governing body; and providing goods and services that cannot be obtained within the 
constraints of the law. In our case studies we see examples of groups providing one or 
both services. There is, nonetheless, no reason to believe that entering one side of the 
business always leads to the other and, in fact, there are many groups that specialize in 
“protection” and others who specialize in providing illegal goods and services. 
Yet, they do have something in common. Each type of organization emerges and 
flourishes in the same environment: where the trust between the government and the 
people has been broken or does not exist because of the corruption, absence or 
ineptitude of government officials and institutions. 
The lack of a reliable state entity helps explain, for example, why noted crime scholar 
Diego Gambetta centers his mafia thesis on the concept of the provision of protection. 
With “the protection racket,” as the thesis is often referred to, Gambetta’s central 
argument is that organized crime emerged to protect the essence of the economy: 
commercial transactions.11 For Gambetta, the commodity that the mafia, as he refers to 
organized crime, is selling to the public can be described in one word: trust. “Rather 
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than producing cars, beer, nuts and bolts, or books, they produce and sell trust,” 
Gambetta writes.12 
Mafia-guaranteed transactions occur where the state does not have enough physical 
presence, where it is corrupted, or where it lacks regulatory measures to ensure any safe, 
equitable transactions. There is, in essence, no effective arbiter, and criminal 
organizations fill that void. “In essence, mafiosi operate in those economic transactions 
and agreements where trust, while of paramount importance, is nevertheless fragile, 
and where it is either inefficiently supplied or cannot be supplied at all by the state: 
typically, in illegal transactions in otherwise legal goods, or in all transactions in illegal 
goods,” he writes.13 
In order to do this, the criminal organizations took on the two critical functions that are 
traditionally associated with the state -- namely that of collecting “taxes” (either in 
regular quotas or as a percentage of transactions), and that of creating a monopoly of 
force to guarantee these commercial arrangements. At its heart, this is the social 
contract that citizens have with the state: protection in return for revenue. Organized 
crime can supplant that contract with their own, parallel contract. 
Of course, the underworld rarely ensures regular, equitable transactions. Mafiosi are 
subject to the same whims and arbitrary decision-making processes that make dictators 
unpopular. However, in some instances, this is still preferable to the unpredictable and 
extractive nature of some government authorities. Mafiosi can, as Gambetta says, play a 
positive role in the economy as well, fostering commercial relations where there might 
otherwise be very few. When trust is low, for example, the guarantor is the difference 
between securing a transaction, and no transaction at all, he says. 
The result was the widespread emergence of these guarantors in many parts of the 
world. For Albini -- who was also writing about the origins of the mafia in Italy -- these 
guarantors were what were called in 19th Century Sicily “gabellotto.” The role of 
gabellotto went well beyond that of community strongman. According to Albini, the 
gabellotti were the glue between peasants and their lords. In Albini’s view, they could 
therefore be either patrons or clients, or both. As clients, they served a critical function 
for their large, land-holding masters: keeping workers in line and ensuring peasants 
paid their dues. They did this by creating and fostering armed gangs, who were also 
responsible for the “protection” of the local communities. 
This set the stage for what Albini calls an “industry of violence.”14 These gangs helped to 
spread the gabellotti’s own power base either by theft, intimidation or by doing favors 
for the local lords. That allowed them to become landholders and patrons themselves. 
Their clients were the same peasants they claimed to protect. Thus the pattern was 
established for this “mafia” to emerge and spread. 
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The gabellotti gained further power when Italy established universal suffrage. Suddenly, 
they controlled votes and could ensure political power as well as social and economic 
control. They were also the interlocutors for the peasants to express their grievances to 
the lords and their political representatives. By the 1860s, Albini writes, Sicily’s 
gabellotti had the makings of a modern-day mafia via: “1) the use or threat of use of 
violence, 2) an organization (his private bands) to carry out this violence, and 3) the 
assurance of governmental protection through his new role as a vote procurer.”15 Over 
time, the gabellotti used this power and influence to open doors of social ascension for 
their offspring. (This idea of vertical mobility via criminal enterprises is a regular theme 
throughout studies on organized crime, and something we cover briefly later in this 
chapter.)  
Modern-day Latin America, as we shall see in our case studies, has eerily similar 
dynamics to that of 19th Century Italy. Local landlords have an almost feudal control 
over territory and labor. They interact with politicians and other state actors who 
regularly interact with criminals of various levels of sophistication, size and scope. These 
criminal actors often collect “taxes” from residents and provide protection services for a 
fee. These criminal actors also provide votes (and campaign funding) for politicians (or 
create their own political vehicles to achieve political power). Finally, the criminal actors 
also frequently serve as interlocutors between the “peasants” and the state and other 
landlords; and over time, the criminal actors can become landlords themselves.   
Of course, organized crime also fulfills other needs, the ones we typically associate with 
them. It provides goods and services that are illegal or defined as contraband. Criminal 
actors are, for example, responsible for supplying much of the illegal drugs consumed, 
as well as contraband cigarettes, prostitutes and other vice. They sell knock-off clothes, 
and pirated movies and video games. They steal and sell petroleum products, and mine 
and sell minerals and gold. They run insurance scams, steal and re-sell property and 
strong-arm businesses and workers via their control of unions. In short, there are few 
commercial spaces where there is not element of organized crime. 
As Albini noted, the power that comes with being an interlocutor for the communities 
also means criminals can fill important economic, political and social gaps. It can secure 
loans where banks will not. It can pressure political representatives to respond to the 
needs of the community where it operates. It fills social vacuums by financing projects 
such as village festivals or the construction of a sports facility. It can provide labor where 
it is needed or suppress it when it is in revolt. In all instances, the common denominator 
is an absent, corrupt or inept state that condones, works alongside or is the motor of 
criminal activity. 
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Thesis 2: Organized crime can undermine the state and distort the 
economy, but it can also help to provide avenues to higher social and 
economic standing; help to drive an economy; and, in some instances, help 
to strengthen the state. 
While Gambetta and Albini focus the impact this criminal presence can have at the local 
and sub-national level and give us our understanding of individual and communal 
relations with criminal groups -- i.e., in commerce, trade and politics in the local 
townships -- others, such as Charles Tilly, illustrate how this phenomenon can play out 
on the macro level with regards to the formation of the nation-state. For Tilly, it starts 
with the idea that state is a form of “protection racket”: its monopoly on the use of force 
within a territory allows it to charge for this service, which is necessary for the 
development of commerce and regular commercial exchanges. 
To reach this point, however, strong clan and feudal leaders regularly relied on 
periphery criminal actors. Like Albini, Tilly argues that these criminal actors often 
performed both political and military roles for these clan and feudal leaders. But Tilly 
takes it further, arguing that these groups helped lay the groundwork for modern, 
centralized nation-states in Europe. Interestingly, Tilly says these alliances were not 
sought for the express purpose of creating a nation state. Instead, they were the natural 
result of a process whereby war begat territory, which begat resource extraction, which 
begat larger military forces, which begat more war and so on. “War making, extraction 
and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making,” he writes.16 
On its surface, this thesis does not contradict Max Weber’s classic concept of the state as 
the holder of a monopoly on violence. What sets Tilly apart is that he does not 
differentiate between the government’s monopoly on violence and the monopoly on 
violence held by other actors in their own territories or spheres of influence, especially 
as it served the need of a centralized authority and the development of the nation-state 
itself. These other actors essentially operate as the state under a different moniker. And 
in some instances, these actors assist the process of state building, even while they are 
committing illegal acts to gain and maintain their power. “Banditry, piracy, gangland 
rivalry, policing and war making all belong on the same continuum,” Tilly argues.17 
The process by which we could therefore determine who was a “legitimate” and who was 
an “illegitimate” force came about slowly and was fraught with contradictions, Tilly says. 
Pirates on the sea and marauders on land were the economic motors of some of the first 
city-states. Soldiers were often expected to feed themselves by pillaging civilian 
populations. And Tilly notes that Robin Hood’s transformation into “royal archer” (i.e., 
a state-sanctioned paramilitary) was typical of this fuzzy line between “legitimate” and 
“illegitimate.” 
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This tension -- challenging the state and the economy on the one side and supporting 
them on the other -- is constant in developing nations. Just as European kings thought 
of their interactions with criminal actors as a temporary means to an end, so too do 
modern-day elites in the Americas. Researchers such as Vanda Felbab-Brown reinforce 
this view, especially as it relates to modern developing world economies. Criminal 
groups, she says, provide employment, sometimes on a massive scale and over various 
industries; and security via regular and irregular channels; as well as conflict resolution 
-- they are capable of building capacities and providing the type of services that the state 
is supposed to provide. As she states: 
It is thus important to stop thinking about crime solely as aberrant social activity to 
be suppressed, but instead think of crime as a competition in state-making. In 
strong states that effectively address the needs of their societies, the non-state 
entities cannot outcompete the state. But in areas of socio-political marginalization 
and poverty -- in many Latin American countries, conditions of easily upward of a 
third of the population -- non-state entities do often outcompete the state and 
secure the allegiance of large segments of society.18 
What’s more, the economic capital generated by these illicit projects represents massive 
portions of these economies and can also lead to alliances between organized crime and 
state builders. Peter Andreas posits that organized crime, in particular smuggling, was 
paramount to the independence movement and the subsequent economic development 
of the United States in numerous respects. From molasses smuggling in the colonial 
days to the current movement of illegal migrant workers who are vital to the modern 
economy, the United States has fostered many of these economic activities. 
Andreas is particularly concerned with “how the state makes smuggling and how 
smuggling makes the state.”19 This relationship between organized crime and the state is 
a critical part of this study. Like Andreas, we embrace the premise that this is a 
complicated and difficult relationship that depends as much on norms and laws as it 
does timing and the political leaders of the moment. “This is not to imply a simple, 
mechanical interaction,” Andreas writes of this nearly constant dance the state must 
perform with the illicit economy. 
There is nothing natural or automatic about it. Throughout American history, we 
see the full range of state interactions with smuggling, from collusion and toleration 
to discouragement and condemnation. This is why politics is such a vital part of the 
story…Beyond the mechanics of illicit trade, it includes the morally charged politics 
of deviance and vice that is so often wrapped up in the issue of smuggling and the 
policing of smuggling. Here, politics, economics, and culture intersect and mix, 
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often in explosive ways and with unanticipated and long-lasting repercussions for 
American society and America’s foreign relations.20 
Andreas is not the first to note the irony of US development. Albini and McIllwain 
describe the American colonies as a place bursting with pirates selling contraband, in 
large part because of the high taxes and high prices of goods serviced from the British 
Motherland. Writing about the colonial period, Albini and McIllwain say: “This system 
of cooperation between criminals, government officials, merchants and the citizens who 
purchased illegal goods constitutes the basic ingredients for one of the prominent forms 
of American organized crime, which we have come to call syndicated organized."21 
Modern states have also developed with criminal-business-political alliances that 
stretch across legal boundaries. In Taiwan, Ko-lin Chin argues that one of the country’s 
foremost traditional powerbrokers, the KMT party, sought to maintain power by allying 
itself with “heidao,” or mafia, figures on the local level.22 Other parties, the author says, 
may have also aligned themselves with the heidao. The heidao eventually began to back 
their own candidates, which included prominent businessmen who sought entry into 
politics for their own ends. The resulting triumvirate of interests between the three 
parties is, as we shall see, similar in some countries in the Americas. 
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The development of the modern Russian state and economy, Patricia Rawlinson argues, 
is also intrinsically linked to organized crime.23 Criminal enterprises mixed with 
legitimate businesses have filled the void left by the state when communism fell. 
Rawlinson quotes a Russian government study that says that 40,000 businesses were 
controlled by organized crime in the mid-1990s. This dependence on criminal 
businesses and shady businessmen has made it impossible to conduct business without 
interacting with criminal interests. It has also made crime and politics 
“indistinguishable” from one another.24 The criminal actors have taken the place of the 
state in many respects, providing, for example, protection and debt collection services. 
“Organized crime has supplanted many of the functions of the state, and currently 
represents the only fully functioning social institution,” Rawlinson says. 
The implication is that organized crime cuts both ways for the state. It can serve as an 
economic motor of development and a security force that helps develop the nation-state, 
widen its boundaries and increase its reach; or it can serve as a justification for the 
development of the security forces, which in and of itself can help foster a new elite, 
which we call a bureaucratic elite. What’s more, in our case studies we can see examples 
in which both of these tendencies -- seemingly at cross-purposes ---- actually serve a 
single end for one particular elite. In other words, while they might condemn criminal 
activity on one level, they use organized crime in its various manifestations -- economic, 
political and military -- on another. 
Thesis 3: Organized crime is not limited by class, political affiliation or 
social status, and, at its core, it is about power. 
Too often we view organized crime as a bottom-up activity, one that emerges in the 
depths of society, in poverty-stricken circumstances, and worms its way into the upper 
echelons of political and economic power structures. This, as Tilly and Albini point out, 
is a convenient argument that affords the elites a pass. Still, the most common vision of 
these criminal groups is that of predator. In this view, the criminals are outsiders. They 
emerge from the lower classes of society. They are driven by greed, flawed youth and 
inadequate education. In the most perverted depictions, they are criminals by nature, or 
for “cultural” or ethnic reasons. And they are frequently characterized as ruthless social 
climbers, in part because of their low socio-economic origins. 
There are certainly cases that fit this mold, the most famous of which is Pablo Escobar. 
Escobar was the consummate outsider. He was a car thief who rose through the criminal 
ranks first as a contraband and illegal drug transporter, then later as an international 
drug distributor. He made vast sums of money but eventually sought political power, 
attaching himself to a wing of the Liberal Party in Colombia. He also tried to gain access 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elites and Organized Crime             	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
www.InSightCrime.org   32	  
to the elite by attempting to join the exclusive Medellin country club and sending his 
children to posh schools. 
The Colombian elite thwarted both his political and social strivings. Marginalized and 
hurt, he struck back with a brutal and public campaign. He kidnapped elites and 
exploded bombs at malls; his men detonated a bomb on an airplane in flight killing all 
aboard. To some extent, his methods worked. He was able to change the country’s 
constitution. But he never achieved what he really wanted: the power that comes with 
being an elite. 
That power is reflected in the way we view the elite’s transgressions. Elites have their 
own legal category when it comes to organized crime: white-collar crime. But the 
distinction between organized crime and white-collar crime is fuzzy at best. Technically, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) refers to it as “frauds committed by business 
and government professionals,” or “lying, cheating, and stealing.” 25 However, the FBI’s 
own list of white-collar criminal acts -- which includes identity theft, money laundering, 
piracy and intellectual property theft -- could very easily apply to our list of organized 
crime activities. 
White-collar crime is often differentiated from organized crime because it is not 
considered violent, yet illegal drug dealing, prostitution or even racketeering are not 
necessarily violent. Meanwhile, a white-collar crime such as money laundering can be a 
very violent business. In fact, at its core, the only real distinction in the law and in many 
judicial systems between organized crime and white-collar crime -- according to Edwin 
Sutherland, the man who coined the term -- is class. 
“The respects in which the crimes of the two classes differ are the incidentals rather than 
the essentials of criminality. They differ principally in the implementation of the 
criminal laws which apply to them,” he wrote. “This difference in the implementation of 
the criminal law is due principally to the difference in the social position of the two types 
of offenders.”26 
For this project, we do not distinguish between white-collar crime and organized crime. 
White-collar crime and organized crime are, as Vicenzo Ruggiero states, the 
same.27 They both act in accordance with their needs and employ similar techniques to 
achieve their goals, which Ruggiero argues should be studied in the same way, 
regardless of the “social characteristics or background of the perpetrators.” 
This is why our conceptual approach is that criminal groups are born from all strata of 
society. Their members include wealthy, poor and those in between. They may have 
studied at the best universities, or never have attended school. They are politicians and 
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businessmen; union leaders and clergy; military officers and police captains; thieves and 
marauders. And their criminal acts need to be studied in the same way. 
Andreas, for instance, notes that John Hancock, one of the United States’ preeminent 
molasses smugglers, was also the first signatory to the Declaration of Independence and 
one of the architects of the revered US Constitution.28 This alliance between Hancock 
and the other business and political elites in the British colonies was the result of 
Hancock’s integration of a shipping service that included licit and illicit goods. In 
essence, Hancock was what in modern-day Central America we would call a 
“transportista.” 
Examples also abound in our case studies. In two of our case studies, it is the elites 
themselves who are designing and implementing the criminal schemes. In the others, it 
is the elites who are benefitting from them, using them to expand their political 
influence, their economic reach or their social base. There are few who question this 
elite participation in criminal acts today -- which is why we embarked on this project -- 
and even fewer who have faced accusations of wrongdoing. 
The paths these elites take to reach wealth and power are not just an illustration of the 
way in which elites also take part in organized crime, they are critical to understanding 
why other non-elites do so as well. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have 
chronicled, these elites are often the same ones who are developing (or not, as the case 
may be) the very institutions that govern these societies. In essence, elites can skew the 
nature and mission of the government so it is geared towards protecting what Acemoglu 
and Robinson term an “extractive” system that is parasitical in its own destructive 
way.29 
These systems thwart economic and political development over the long term, but they 
also open up opportunity for organized crime to thrive. “Extractive” states skew the way 
in which the state deploys its security resources, collects its taxes, and applies justice. 
The result is that social ascension, of the type that Pablo Escobar sought, is stymied. In 
other words, the “extractive” system impedes upward mobility, leaving few 
opportunities for those outside of the small group of political, social and economic elites 
to join their club. Criminal activity, as it operates along the margins of the formal 
economic and political spheres, can level the playing field in crude but effective ways by 
creating opportunities to obtain huge amounts of capital in short time spans, and 
offering protection services to these ruling elites, among other ways. 
As it was in 18th Century Sicily, these services can open doors and provide what Daniel 
Bell famously described as a “queer ladder of social mobility.” 
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“Crime, in the language of the sociologists, has a ‘functional’ role in the society, and the 
urban rackets -- the illicit activity organized for continuing profit rather than individual 
illegal acts -- is one of the queer ladders of social mobility,” Bell wrote.30 
These “social climbers” nearly always face backlash from those who came before them, 
Bell says, even if those who came before them used some of the same tactics to reach 
their status. 
The pioneers of American Capitalism were not graduated from Harvard’s School of 
Business Administration. The early settlers and founding fathers, as well as those 
who “won the West” and built up cattle, mining and other fortunes, often did so by 
shady speculation and a not inconsiderable amount of violence. They ignored, 
circumvented or stretched the law when it stood in the way of America’s destiny, 
and their own -- or, were themselves the law when it served their purposes. This has 
not prevented them and their descendants from feeling proper moral outrage when 
under the changed circumstances of the crowded urban environments later comers 
pursued equally ruthless tactics.31  
The pattern repeats itself in our case studies. The established elites vilify the non-elites. 
To this day, Pablo Escobar and his family remain the punching bags for news 
organizations owned and run by Colombia’s elites. The bankers, the landowners, the 
mining companies, the cattle ranchers and others who established themselves and their 
families by undermining the rule of law stand in judgment of the Escobars who seek 
social ascension via “organized crime.” But these families have traveled similar roads. 
Both involve nefarious means, subversion of the state, violence (albeit to varying 
degrees) and other tactics. More importantly, both are after the same goal: power. 
The quest for power, not wealth, is at the heart of this project.32 For us, it is an 
important distinction. Organized crime is most often associated with specific criminal 
acts that often bring their participants vast sums of money. But organized crime, of the 
type that we are focused on, is about so much more than the simple accumulation of 
economic capital. While certainly an important factor in the underworld dynamic and 
the ability to obtain power, economic resources, as Pablo Escobar discovered, do not 
automatically give you power. 
For organized crime, obtaining power requires relationships and networks. To begin 
with, organized crime necessarily involves security forces. Organized crime uses these 
various connections to facilitate the actual businesses, as well as protect its main players 
from prosecution. As Albini notes, “Provision of illegal services…because they 
necessitate contact between the criminal and the client on a continuous basis, cannot be 
readily carried on without soon coming under police or public scrutiny.”33 These 
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connections also include prosecutors, judges, low-level functionaries at port entries and 
airports, among others. 
In its more sophisticated forms, organized crime co-opts high-level government 
officials, and fosters politicians and even political parties. In some of our case studies, 
these government officials, politicians and criminal groups are all part of the same 
criminal organization, or at least working towards the same ends. The political capital 
that comes with these relationships allows criminal groups to exert power in particular 
ways that permit them to avoid prosecution, advance and expand their business 
interests, and establish a base from which to exert power over state resources, as 
Rawlinson shows in the case of Russia. 
Finally, organized crime obtains power by intersecting with the communities in which it 
operates, which allows it to gain important social capital, thereby adding a further layer 
of protection from prosecution and public scrutiny. This, as mentioned earlier, can come 
from supplanting the state as neighborhood watchdog, i.e., its police and often its 
judicial system. In addition, as some of our case studies illustrate, criminal groups build 
support by providing jobs and services to the community. Social capital can also, as 
Desmond Arias shows, come through direct contact and work with community leaders, 
gaining their trust and supporting their projects.34 And social capital can be 
accumulated by sponsoring sources of community pride, such as festivals or soccer 
teams. 
In our view, the accumulation of economic, political, and social capital are the 
foundations of power, and it is this power, as we shall see, that allows organized crime to 
emerge, expand and sustain its operations. In some instances, this process is truncated, 
and we are witness to the downfall of a criminal empire or its leader. These instances 
form the basis of most of our case studies. In other instances, it proceeds apace, 
providing the base from which families can be made, new elites can emerge and nation-
states can be built. In all instances, it is a destructive, messy process that involves a 
multiplicity of actors, both state and non-state, elites and non-elites, rich and poor, city 
folk and rural peasants, criminals and innocent civilians. Those are the stories that 
follow.    
Endnotes 
[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “United Nations Convention Against 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elites and Organized Crime             	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
www.InSightCrime.org   36	  
[2] Joseph Albini and Jeffrey McIllwain, Deconstructing Organized Crime: A Historical and Theoretical 
Study (London, 2012), pp. 81-82. 
[3] This idea dates back at least to the work of Walter Lippmann. See: Lippmann, "Underworld: Our 
Secret Servant,” Forum, 85 (1931), pp. 1-4, 65-69. (Quoted in Nikos Passos (ed,), Organized 
Crime (Dartmouth, VT, 1995), p. 9) 
[4] Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York, 1971), pp. 34-35. 
[5] Ibid., p. 10. 
[6] D.R. Taft and R. W. England, Criminology (New York, 1964), cited in Joseph Albini and Jeffrey 
McIllwain, Deconstructing Organized Crime: A Historical and Theoretical Study (London, 2012), p. 18.  
[7] See: Joseph Albini and Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Invisible 
Hand (Cambridge, MA, 1983). 
[8] See: Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia (Cambridge, MA, 1993). 
[9] Michael D. Maltz, "On Defining ‘Organized Crime’: The Development of a Definition and a Typology,” 
in Crime & Delinquency, July 1976, p. 341. (Cited in Passos, p. 18). 
[10] See (among others): James Cockayne, “State Fragility, Organised Crime and Peacebuilding: Towards 
a more Strategic Approach,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, September 2011.  
[11] Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia (Cambridge, MA, 1993), pp. 19-20. 
[12] Diego Gambetta, “Fragments of an economic theory of the mafia,” the European Journal of Sociology 
(or Archives of European Sociology), XXIX (1988), pp. 127-145. 
[13] Ibid. 
[14] Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York, 1971), p. 129. 
[15] Ibid., p. 134. 
[16] Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 169-191. 
[17] Ibid., p. 171. 
[18] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Conceptualizing Crime as Competition in State-Making and Designing an 
Effective Response,” from a speech given to the Conference on Illicit Trafficking Activities in the Western 
Hemisphere: Possible Strategies and Lessons Learned, 21 May 2010. 
[19] Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (New York, 2013), p. 2. 
[20] Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elites and Organized Crime             	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
www.InSightCrime.org   37	  
[21] Joseph Albini and Jeffrey McIllwain, Deconstructing Organized Crime: A Historical and Theoretical 
Study (London, 2012), p. 12, 
[22] Ko-Lin Chin, “Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics” (New York, 2003), pp. 14-15. 
[23] Patricia Rawlinson, “Russian Organized Crime: A Brief History,” in Phil Williams (ed.), Russian 
Organized Crime: A New Threat? (London, 1997), pp. 28-52. 
[24] Ibid., p. 57. 
[25] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “White-Collar Crime.” Available at:http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar 
[26] Edwin H. Sutherland, “White-Collar Criminality,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Feb., 
1940), pp. 1-12. 
[27] Vicenzo Ruggiero, Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe: Offers that Can’t be 
Refused (Vermont, 1996), p. 21. 
[28] Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (New York, 2013), pp. 4-5. 
[29] Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (New York, 2012), p. 393. (Kindle edition.) 
[30] Daniel Bell, “Crime as an American Way of Life,” The Antioch Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1953, 
p. 133. 
[31] Ibid., p. 152. 
[32] We have relied on Steven Lukes’ definition of power: “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a 
manner contrary B’s interests.” See: Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (MacMillon, 1974), p. 31.  
[33] Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (Nueva York, 1971), p. 56. 
[34] See: Enrique Desmond Arias, "The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in 
Rio de Janeiro," Journal of Latin American Studies, 38, (2006). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elites and Organized Crime             	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
www.InSightCrime.org   38	  
Conceptual Framework: Elites 
By Javier Meléndez 
 
his InSight Crime project defines elites as: specific groups of people with a 
privileged position that allows them to control, direct or greatly influence the 
dynamics of community life in political, social, cultural and/or economic terms. 
We base this definition on three theoretical concepts. The first comes from Goran 
Therborn. He describes what he calls the “dominant class,” or failing that, an alliance of 
dominant classes, which is broad in its power and reach. Part of this construct rests on 
the idea that every state has a class character and every society a dominant class, which 
is dominant because it has hegemonic power over at least three aspects of society: 
economics, politics (embodied by the state) and ideology.1 To Therborn, the dominant 
class is not necessarily installed within the state, but its actions and power 
(interventions) are such that it influences state policies for its own benefit. His 
perspective also assumes a dominant class is not homogeneous, but often broken into 
factions. It is a dominant class with diverse interests. Therborn recognizes that the 
power of the dominant class is not only based on economic aspects but also political and 
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ideological ones, and that it makes use of those resources to legitimize itself before 
society and intervene in the state, either from within or from the outside. Thus, while 
recognizing the strong determination of economic relations in the constitution of the 
dominant class, it also attributes great significance to the political and ideological 
aspects. 
Our second concept for understanding the elites comes from Gaetano Mosca, who 
understands elites as a “ruling class” or a “political class,” which is made up of a 
minority of people who direct what Mosca calls “public affairs.” They perform all 
political functions, monopolize power and enjoy its advantages. This class consists of a 
minority whose qualities distinguish them from the governed masses and give them 
material, intellectual and moral superiority. Analyzing the historical makeup of the 
ruling class, Mosca identifies among its members: political and military leaders, wealthy 
landowners, religious hierarchies and high-level state bureaucrats.2 For Mosca, the 
political class tends to become hereditary by law or by circumstance, and develops 
attitudes and qualities for acquiring and conserving power. But when important changes 
happen in society, the ruling class also changes by either renewing itself or making room 
for a new ruling class. While acknowledging the distinction between governors and the 
governed is not novel, it does help identify the “ruling class” through its real and 
effective control of the state. 
Mosca establishes that “the governing minority is made of individuals that distinguish 
themselves from the governed masses by determining qualities that grant them a certain 
material and intellectual superiority. Social position, family tradition and class ethos 
determine and condition the character of men, as well as certain cultural bases which 
help determine the superiority of the political class.”3 
The third concept in which we base our understanding of elites comes from C. Wright 
Mills, who, through a historical analysis on the makeup of elites in the United States, 
identified key groups in different periods.4 He argues that the middle of the post-World 
War II period produced a process of political power infiltration by “corporate leaders” 
and “military men” that became an elite made up of politicians, military leaders and 
capitalists that made decisions together, except in certain situations where the interests 
of one group prevailed. 
Mills also does not believe this elite is homogenous. In reference to Mosca, Mills argues 
that members of the elite have a common origin and education, but their class origin 
does not necessarily mean they only represent the interests of this class and that behind 
that concept of a ruling class is the idea of an economic class that manages politics as 
well.5 Mills argues that Mosca’s idea of a “ruling class” is not appropriate because the 
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term alludes to economic power, but elites are not always made of people with economic 
power. Such is the case of political elites and state bureaucratic elites. 
Adapting the Theoretical Approaches 
In general terms, literature on elites offers a restricted view of their configuration as it 
focuses on political and economic levels, their relation to the market and the state as it 
relates to acquiring power, or conflicts over control of the state and the market. 
Empirical evidence from case studies 
inGuatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Colombia reinforces our focus on the existence 
of diverse elites, forming something akin to elite factions. The evidence indicates that 
the last 30 years has been marked by conflicts amongst elites that have led to some 
dispersal of power. 
Contrary to the idea that the dispersal of power and authority amongst different elites 
generates a balance of power in their democratic societies while neutralizing tensions 
and reconciling interests among them,6 in Central America multiple interests generated 
by different elites have provoked tensions as well as legitimate and illegal ad hoc 
alliances. These alliances aim at controlling the state, are not transparent to public 
management, and are key to preserving the economic and political interests of elites, as 
well as helping them maintain social control. 
Due to this diversification of traditional structures and the scramble for power, we feel 
the need to examine each piece and understand how elites function within societies and 
states. We accept that there is a general idea that elites influence the direction or 
dynamics of community life in political, social, cultural and economic terms. But our 
focus assumes said elites come from a variety of sectors including government and non-
government actors, military and economic sectors, community organizations and 
politics. 
In this sense, it is important to specify at least three scenarios regarding the 
configuration of elites and the way they usually impose their interests. 
The first is when the dominant classes exert political control over either a weak or a 
strong state. On the basis of this strength or weakness, criminal groups find space for 
their illegal activities. In other words, elites set the standard for the creation of the rule 
of law, the justice system, the tax system, the security forces and other aspects that may 
curb the activities of organized crime. Problems occur when there is a notable lack of 
incentives to create strong institutions, like in Central America, because they may also 
limit the elites’ own empires, which often are held through illicit arrangements. 
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The second element is the introduction of a military or bureaucratic elite as a key 
variable in the study given the importance of this powerful group in Latin American 
history and its role in developing both the state and organized crime. Evidence 
from Guatemala, Colombia and Honduras shows that there can be no understanding of 
organized crime dynamics without paying attention to the role of the military in the last 
50 years. 
Mills’ approach enables us to take the concept of “powerful elites,” which empirically 
identifies groups that have and exercise power from different capitals: economic, 
political, symbolic, etc. This is because societies are complex and various elites also have 
interests that conflict with the others. The key element of the analysis is that the spaces 
where power is exercised are scattered and elites are diverse. 
Our understanding begins with the premise that there is a plurality of elites that not 
only compete for state and market control, but also influence the life of the communities 
where they live. We also agree that the term “elite” refers to various groups in society 
that enjoy privileged status and exercise decisive control over social organization. 
Although elite suggests a position of power, it does not necessarily require wealth or an 
official title.7 From this perspective, we break down these elites into three categories: 
economic, political and social. We also introduce the concept of bureaucratic elites, 
since it their role as bureaucrats within the state that puts resources and power at their 
disposal. These bureaucratic elites have played a key role in the success of the 
operations of organized crime networks, so much so that delineating and exploring their 
development and reach has been paramount to the project. 
The Elites, Their Profiles and Their Ways of Exercising Power 
We take as a starting point that one of the traditional characteristics of economic 
elites is that they control the means of production and exercise strong influence over 
the labor market and consumption. Their power base is the economic capital they have 
accumulated, which they use to exercise power not only in economic circles but also in 
political and social arenas. This economic capital includes land or property, natural 
resources and finances. They are also committed to influencing public opinion to adjust 
it to their economic interests. This is usually accomplished through oligopolies that 
concentrate the most important media in their hands, including radio, newspapers and 
television.  
Political elites, for their part, are connected to parties and political movements. They 
look to use their political connections to increase their hegemony over communities. In 
other words, political elites use state resources or connections to the state and political 
parties in order to play a dominant role in the life of communities they inhabit. These 
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political elites do not have to hold a political position to exert influence. They may be a 
party leader, a consigliore or a lobbyist with political parties to ensure that the interests 
of those elites are aligned with economic power groups. However, for the purposes of 
this initiative, we have limited the scope of the political elites to those who operate 
through the structure of political parties. This also helps us to understand the operation 
of the scope of the bureaucratic elites and specify the role they have in the sustainability 
and success of organized crime. 
Social elites we understand as actors with leadership roles and the ability to direct the 
community or region, putting forth strong ideas alongside the capacity to promote and 
mobilize these ideas. This can include community and religious leaders as well as artists 
and intellectuals. This elite does not necessarily have political or economic power to 
exercise. But they can obtain both in the process, and they can also use their technical 
knowledge of the structure and procedures of the state to their advantage. They are not 
an elite by having gained their position through the electoral process. Their position as 
elites is won through leadership, credibility, legitimacy, debate and acting in a manner 
that creates confidence and support within the community. These characteristics are 
fundamental in understanding the configuration of local power in multiethnic 
communities, like Guatemala, and multiethnic regions like those in Nicaragua. 
The bureaucratic elites refers to a specific group, enmeshed in the state apparatus, 
with power and capacity for decision-making. Operationally these elites can achieve a 
relative autonomy from the economic and political elites, and are organized on the basis 
of their resources and their own interests. Their importance lies in the power and 
hegemony they have over state resources: its procedures, their technical capacity and 
their leadership. This includes the police and to a much greater extent the military. The 
level of differentiation and complexity of the functions of a society can be seen in the 
degree of development and specialization of the state, such as in its economic activities. 
Hence, as stated by Max Weber and Mills, the state is made up of a group of people with 
a level of specialization, which gives life to a state bureaucracy that acquires power as 
measured by their level of specialization and their capacity to make decisions.8 This 
bureaucracy creates in turn bureaucratic elites with power over state resources, 
including political resources. Mills and Mosca explain how this bureaucracy came to be 
and was incorporated into the power elites of the United States and Europe, through a 
long period in which bureaucratic elites weaved their relations and links with economic 
and political elites, until becoming part of them.9 We see the same in some of our case 
studies, but note that in Central American countries the possibilities of autonomy for 
bureaucratic elites with respect to economic political elites are marginalized by lack of 
meritocratic processes in the appointment of senior management and intermediate 
institutions in the state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elites and Organized Crime             	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
www.InSightCrime.org   43	  
Of course, there is some mixing between these groups. It is an inevitable consequence of 
living in complex societies where there is social, political and, to a lesser extent, 
economic mobility. However, we believe it is essential to distinguish between the 
influence that each group has, so that we can better understand where, why and how 
organized crime intersects with these elites. Understanding the intersections of 
organized crime with elites can help us understand the basis on which this criminal 
phenomenon arises, develops and survives. As outlined above, the elite interests are 
diverse and disputed. Staying in power allows them to promote these interests in several 
ways. This includes maintaining and exploiting weak states to position the interests of 
organized crime groups, by association with these groups, and by sabotaging reforms 
that could limit the penetration of criminal elements in the state. 
This approach is also based on the premise that the elites are dynamic. They relate and 
interact with each other depending on their interests and the balance of power in which 
they are positioning themselves, and it is in that framework they also interact with 
criminal groups. 
Vulnerable States, Powerful Elites and Corruption 
To understand the perspective proposed in the project on elites and organized crime, the 
role of the Central American elites in the state needs to be put into context. This means 
understanding that the Central American elites have been essential to creating a system 
of interactions that ensures their control of the state and its institutions, with a view to 
perpetuating or at least extending their privileges as power groups. Operationally it is 
through the state that the elites exert their prerogatives, but they also use the state to 
“sell protection” to criminal networks involved in drug trafficking or embezzlement of 
public resources. This scenario is not exempt from the conflicts amongst elites who use 
influence peddling, corruption and impunity to service their ends. This becomes 
important once we look at governance in Central America and Colombia, and from there 
the vulnerability and fragility of the states and their institutions stemming from 
relations and the interplay with criminal networks with the elites in an environment of 
corruption and endemic impunity.  
In this regard, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International, 
which assigns a score and ranks countries according to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption in the public sector, ranked Hondurasnumber 133 out of 175 countries in its 
2012 report. This was the worst in Central America and the fourth least transparent in 
the hemisphere.Nicaragua (130) and Guatemala (113) were also counted among the 
worst evaluated in Central America. Guatemala, the best rated of the three countries, 
was located just twenty points ahead of Somalia, the least transparent country in the 
world according to the index, and was almost 70 points behind Denmark, the most 
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transparent.10 In the 2014 index, Honduras improved slightly (126) but still ranked 
alongside Nicaragua (133) and Guatemala (115) as some of the least transparent in 
Central America. In the hemisphere they only ranked above Paraguay (150), Haiti (161) 
and Venezuela (161).11 
Regarding these governments’ high rates of corruption, a report by International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was emphatic in indicating that traffickers take 
advantage of weak government institutions to establish new transit routes and finance 
corruption with the proceeds of their illicit activities.12 A United Nations report on drug 
trafficking in Central America also indicated that although the trade has affected the 
region through violence, the region’s instability is rooted in fragile institutions that have 
encouraged the presence of non-state actors.13 Said non-state actors -- in collusion with 
business and political elites as well as high military and civilian officials -- have 
managed to implement sophisticated criminal operations, which exploit this 
environment of impunity and corruption. 
Institutional fragility guarantees elites will tolerate grey zones operating in all types of 
illicit businesses that are oriented towards perpetuating their interests. In practical 
terms, elites look to control public politics and, when necessary and convenient, 
minimize interventions aimed at opening the state to public scrutiny and accountability. 
In this sense, the state is less a guardian and generator of common interests, and more 
an instrument of private groups with private interests. The mixing and interplay 
between elites and organized crime grows roughly in proportion to the state’s inability to 
enable processes that foster transparency and accountability. In the words of Joaquin 
Villalobos, the state’s weakness allows small groups to meet and form hierarchies, until 
they become large criminal organizations capable of coopting institutions. As a result, 
state weakness provokes the emergence of alternative and illegal powers, which fill 
power and order vacuums.14 
In Guatemala -- with all its modernization processes for adapting to the global 
economy -- elites remain central actors in politics, since their economic power is based 
on their formidable ability to control the politics of the state. To cite just one recent 
example, President Oscar Berger (2004-2008), upon starting his term affirmed his 
identity by defining his presidency as a “Government for Business.” To secure control of 
the state, elites employ an array of formal and informal mechanisms, careful to project 
the ideals of a modern elite which is in sync with an agenda of open markets and liberal 
democracy, while trying to preserve their oligarchic roots and legacies. But power 
relations of elites with regard the Guatemalan state cannot be understood without 
referring to the performance of security forces in the erosion of the state and the fragility 
of that state as a result of requirements by the elites to make it an instrument serving 
their interests.   
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In every government administration, business people form pressure groups, familial or 
by industry, that look to win political power that provides protection and advantages in 
the opening of business opportunities. They do this by financing electoral campaigns, 
which affords them direct access to the highest authorities. They also do this through the 
selection of executives and trade union leaders who represent them via economic and 
financial ministerial cabinets in the central government. 
In Nicaragua, the makeup of the elites should be seen through the lens of recent 
history. The Nicaraguan elite is mixed in composition with interconnection through 
economic, political or social links and a clear interest in occupying the state, exploiting 
its resources to consolidate its power. It is also willing to commit acts of corruption in 
order to strengthen or maintain its position. To operate, these power elites have 
reinforced the existence of a state with large “grey zones,” or functions and areas with 
little or no regulation and control which would otherwise present high risks for those 
committing acts of corruption. These grey zones allow state officials to use government 
resources, whether they be economic, material, institutional or political, for their own 
benefit or that of their power group, with little to no risk of consequences for those 
involved. 
After 17 years of right-wing governments with a neoliberal bent, in 2007, Daniel Ortega 
regained the presidency. This indicates the economic strength of the political elite 
surrounding Ortega, his family group and what can be called the business side of his 
political party, Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).15 
In terms of the elite reconfiguration and management of the state, this implies: a) the 
construction of alliances with other groups to insert themselves in the main axes of the 
national economy, like large agricultural exporters, foreign investors primarily in the 
telecommunications and tourism sectors, financial sector business people, and high 
ranking military; and b) the “colonization” of all state power and spaces, such as control 
of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the electoral regulatory agency, local 
governments (municipal and regional) and all the bodies that control public 
administration, as well as maintaining an iron grip on the police and military.16 The 
strength of the elite that has formed around President Ortega has increased since 2007, 
and it has been able to secure power over other factions through private negotiations to 
establish economic alliances or by eliminating their political parties and movements so 
they do not compete in elections.  
The configuration of elites in Honduras must be understood from the production 
model which began in the 20th century, which favored an enclave economy dominated 
by multinational corporations, and then from the elites’ capacity to control the service 
and banking sectors as well as the media and telecommunications. 
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The effect of so large a multinational presence were complimented by economic changes 
spearheaded by immigrants from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. These families 
helped open up Honduras’ economic landscape by investing heavily in the banking, 
industry and communications media, and other areas. In doing so, they gained influence 
in politics via both of the main political organizations: the National Party and the 
Liberal Party. Historically, politics had been the exclusive domain of Honduras’ 
traditional elites whose power stemmed from the control of land, livestock, mining, 
coffee exports and government office. The faces of the elite, be they old guard or more 
recently arrived, are known to the public through the society pages of newspapers and 
through seats on the boards of private sector organizations. Traditional elites have also 
bolstered their relevance in a modern world through an increased, public presence in 
politics. 
The other element that characterizes the Honduran elite system is their lack of 
homogeneity. The contradictions, confrontations and struggles happen frequently as the 
different power groups vie for control of the state. This is because throughout Honduras’ 
history the state has been a source of legal and physical defense for these interests. State 
control has guaranteed the “rules of the game” and because of this disputes have been 
contextualized in the capacity that one elite has over another to obtain advantages 
through manipulation of public administration and its political power. 
In its most visible expression, elites of all kinds have used the military and police to 
protect their property and businesses for years. Hence the elites’ said dependence on 
security forces to protect their businesses led to the emergence of military leaders as 
relevant political and economic actors. 
But to understand the Honduran elites’ configuration, it’s also necessary to examine the 
role of high-ranking bureaucrats within the state. These powers arose from traditional 
politics and gravitated towards power centers within political parties. This Honduran 
bureaucratic elite is a wildcard. Their value depends on who has them in their hand, and 
their ability to become a key to “winning the game.” Bureaucrats themselves do not have 
great economic power, but their networks and social bases, their charisma, skills, talents 
and handling of electoral issues, represent capital that is hard to obtain with money 
alone. These activities put this elite in a position to make the decisions necessary to 
serve itself as a state facilitator, and when conditions are right, perpetuate the 
bureaucratic pattern of accumulating capital by weaving alliances with economic and 
military elites and, at same time, criminal networks. 
Colombia’s elites have more in common with those from Guatemala than anywhere 
else in Central America. For decades, they concentrated land and industry in their 
hands, while paying little taxes and using the military to their advantage. They also 
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concentrated their power in the capital city, Bogota, where they strove to maintain the 
status quo by controlling the political levers of power and the country’s two political 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. To be sure, in the periphery, there were 
elites, but they were generally isolated from the central government and were largely left 
alone to settle their own disputes as they saw fit. 
The configuration of elites in Colombia was also forged by violence. When a popular 
Liberal politician was assassinated in Bogota in 1948, fighting broke out along party 
lines. Hundreds of thousands were killed. But while the pretext of the fighting was 
political, the heart of the struggle was about land and control over the means of 
production. Over time, the two parties eventually found common ground, designing a 
power-sharing arrangement that put an end to the battles between them but opened the 
way for left-wing insurgencies. The guerrilla war gave the two parties even more 
common cause. It also fomented the development of a bureaucratic elite, mostly 
emanating from the police and military ranks. As a vibrant illicit economy emerged, it 
added yet another important layer to this fight that nearly every side -- guerrillas, as well 
as political, economic and bureaucratic elites -- sought to use for their own ends. 
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Elites and organized crime is a multiyear project financed by the International 
Development Research Centre that investigates the dynamics between organized crime 
and elites in four countries: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia.  
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The InSight Crime Foundation 
	  
InSight Crime is a foundation dedicated to the study of the principal threat to national 
and citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean: organized crime. 
We seek to deepen and inform the debate about organized crime in the Americas by 
providing the general public with regular reporting, analysis and investigation on the 
subject and on state efforts to combat it. 
We fulfill this mission by: 
•   providing high quality and timely analysis of news events linked to organized 
crime in the region; 
•   investigating and writing reports on organized crime and its multiple 
manifestations, including its impact on human rights, governance, drug policy 
and other social, economic and political issues; 
•   giving workshops to journalists, academics and non-governmental organizations 
on how to cover this important issue and keep themselves, their sources and their 
material safe; 
•   supporting local investigators through these workshops and by publishing, 
translating and promoting their work to reach the widest possible audience; 
•   developing a region-wide network of investigators looking at organized crime; 
•   presenting in public and closed-door sessions to governments, non-governmental 
organizations, academics and stakeholders on best practices, strategies and 
pitfalls in implementing citizen security policy on the ground. 
For more information, visit www.insightcrime.org 
Or contact: info@insightcrime.org	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